8


Is this a rule about non-CATSS
 
Congress can regulate non-CATSS where it directly affects CATSS.
Ordinarily, I know, manufacturing and production at least, and some local sales (Schechter Poultry) don’t directly affect CATSS.
But maybe the rule is that “an activity directly affects CATSS if it is engaged in with the purpose of monopolizing CATSS.”
That seems to me to be a sensible rule. It to some sense leaves the directness of an effect to the motives of the person acting, but (to me at least) it feels more comfortable than saying the cases stand for the proposition that an activity is CATSS because of what the actor is thinking.
I disagree with question 5 because I feel the situation is different, which is why the decisions in the Swift and Stafford cases seem to go against the other decisions of the Court during the time period.  The regulations under question in those cases were not dealing directly with the stockyards or slaughterhouses, but how the cattle got to the stockyards.  At the time the owners of the slaughterhouses were attempting to buy the stockyards, and thus directly control where the cattle were brought in from and how much they were then sold to the slaughterhouses (themselves) for.  Thus, the slaughterhouses were actually controlling the movement of the cattle from the time they left the farm they were raised on.  That is why I believe the Court upheld that law, not because of the nature of the business, but because the slaughterhouses were trying to control the stream of commerce.  Unless the pig slaughterhouses were attempting to control the entirety of the process, I do not believe the Court would have upheld the laws if they were only trying to regulate the slaughterhouses.