7


Is this a different test for what is CATSS?
 
Congress can regulate CATSS.
Can I turn the argument into a rule about what is CATSS?
Perhaps the rule is, “A local activity is CATSS if it is engaged in with the intention to monopolize CATSS.”
Possible. But it’s (to me at least) kind of a funny rule – whether or not some activity is “Commerce ... among the several States,” in the constitutional sense, depends on what the person is thinking when he does it. Hard to see, hard to know, hard to prove.
We don’t normally think this way. If I sell my cow to someone in Massachusetts, I think we’d say I was (though not knowingly) engaging in CATSS even if I thought I was selling it to my neighbor in Connecticut.
I might argue this if there were no other choice. But let’s look at the other possibility.
I disagree with question 5 because I feel the situation is different, which is why the decisions in the Swift and Stafford cases seem to go against the other decisions of the Court during the time period.  The regulations under question in those cases were not dealing directly with the stockyards or slaughterhouses, but how the cattle got to the stockyards.  At the time the owners of the slaughterhouses were attempting to buy the stockyards, and thus directly control where the cattle were brought in from and how much they were then sold to the slaughterhouses (themselves) for.  Thus, the slaughterhouses were actually controlling the movement of the cattle from the time they left the farm they were raised on.  That is why I believe the Court upheld that law, not because of the nature of the business, but because the slaughterhouses were trying to control the stream of commerce.  Unless the pig slaughterhouses were attempting to control the entirety of the process, I do not believe the Court would have upheld the laws if they were only trying to regulate the slaughterhouses.